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Offshore Financial Havens: Their Role in International 
Capital Flows 
Sun Zhixiang 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the role of offshore financial havens 
in international capital flows. We examine the effects of being a tax haven, a money 
laundering centre or an offshore financial centre (OFC), which often overlap. We 
want to see whether these places are used as entrepots  (which means temporary 
storage for funds) or as investment places or both. We mainly use two complementary 
data sets: bilateral cross-border asset holding and financial intermediation. One is a 
stock variable and the other one is a flow variable. We apply the gravity model to 
bilateral cross-border asset holding between 223 host countries and 67 source 
countries from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). We find that tax 
havens and OFCs attract more asset investment while money laundering centers scare 
potential investors away. We then use the flow variable of financial intermediation 
from UNdatabase and find value of financial intermediation is higher in OFCs and 
lower in money laundering centers. There is no significant relationship between tax 
haven and financial intermediation. Our results show that the role of offshore havens 
in facilitating illegal activities like tax evasion and money laundering is overstated in 
the previous studies. By allowing parameter shifting in the model, we also find the 
competitive advantages of offshore finance in facilitating tax avoidance or evasion 
and money laundering have been eroded due to recent years¶ global action against tax 
evasion and money laundering. 
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Offshore Financial Havens
1: Their Role in International Capital 
Flows 
Sun Zhixiang 
1. Introduction 
Increasing fluidity of financial systems in conjunction with advancements in 
communication supports the seamless movement of assets and capital from place to 
place. The amount of capital flowing through the global economy has increased to an 
incredible size. At the same time, the number of jurisdictions offering financial 
services in an offshore context has increased consistently in 1980s and 1990s and 
their role in facilitating capital flows has drawn more and more attention. According 
to the rough estimates of economists, about half of the global capital flows through 
the offshore financial centers (OFCs). Calculations based on the data from Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) suggest that, by the end of December 2003, the 
external position of offshore banks in terms of assets had reached US$1.9 trillion, 
compared with US$16 trillion of total bank assets. By the same date, external loans 
had reached US$1.5 trillion or 13 percent of the world cross border bank claims, as 
reported by the BIS. Offshore activity has grown to such an extent that it can no 
longer be considered marginal to the global economy. However, there are relatively 
few well-established empirical works on offshore finance due to the data availability 
problems and lack of theory behind it. We hope this paper can provide some evidence 
of the pattern of international capital flows through offshore financial centers. To the 
best of our knowledge this is the first paper to use financial intermediation and net 
export ratio of financial service to GDP to study the offshore financing issues.  
OFCs can be used for legitimate reasons, taking advantage of several factors 
such as lower explicit taxation, simpler prudential regulatory frameworks that also 
reduce implicit taxation, minimum formalities for incorporation, the existence of 
adequate legal frameworks that safeguard the integrity of principal-agent relations, the 
                                                 
1 By offshore financial havens, we refer to offshore financial centres, tax havens and money laundering 
havens, where offshore finance is usually carried out. The three are often overlapped.   
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proximity to major economies or to countries attracting capital inflows,  the reputation 
of specific OFCs and the specialist services provided, freedom from exchange 
controls and means for safeguarding assets from the impact of litigation etc. OFCs can 
also be exploited for dubious purposes. OFCs attract funds partly because they 
promise anonymity and the possibility of tax avoidance or evasion. A high level of 
bank secrecy is almost invariably used as a selling point by OFCs some of which have 
been exploited for activities related to money laundering (Errico and Musalem, 1999). 
The absence of effective consolidated supervision by onshore supervisors proved to 
be the most important factor in permitting the exploitation of regulatory arbitrage 
offered in some OFCs through the transfer of assets and liabilities between offshore 
establishments and parent banks onshore. Devices that can be used to move earnings 
offshore include: the use of debt contracts, adjustment of transfer prices, and 
conversion of export income into tax haven income (Workman, 1982). In Asia (for 
example in Thailand), regulatory and fiscal advantages as well as lower borrowing 
costs, offered in some OFCs induced many Asian banks and corporations to tap 
international capital markets through offshore establishments (IMF working paper, 
2001) 
Global concerns focus more on lax regulation of OFCs and the illicit nature of 
some offshore business like tax evasion and money laundering. Rose and Spiegel 
(2007) showed that one attraction of moving assets offshore is the ability to pursue 
activities that are prohibited in other countries. Major institutional bodies within the 
onshore world have already expressed uneasiness at the opaque nature of many 
offshore financial services and transactions. Since the late 1990s, the OECD and 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) have initiated a series of 
programs to address unfair taxation practices, money laundering and inadequate 
financial regulation issues, especially after September 11 terrorist attacks (OECD, 
2000b). ,QWKHUHSRUW³+DUPIXOWD[FRPSHWLWLRQDQHPHUJLQJJOREDOLVVXH´WKH
OECD council adopted guidelines for dealing with harmful preferential regimes in 
member countries. Under these guidelines, the harmful features of preferential 
regimes in member countries must be removed within 5 years (by April 2003). In 
May 1998 the G7 Finance Ministers approved an OECD plan which identifies 
jurisdictions offering low or zero tax rates, and set out to nullify this by using 
economic sanctions. In 2000, OECD committee identified 47 preferential tax regimes  
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in 9 overall categories as potentially harmful. It made its list of 35 jurisdictions that 
meet tax haven criteria of the 1998 report. The council also instructed the Committee 
to produce, an OECD list of uncooperative tax havens from the list of tax havens. The 
main criteria for this identification are transparency and effective exchange of 
information. All these countries or territories are urged to change their harmful 
practices to avoid economic sanctions or coordinated defensive measures. The moves 
toward increased information exchange are highly significant since banking secrecy is 
one of the fundamental requirements of offshore finance. 
As responses to the criticism and pressure, since 2000, a lot of OFC governments 
have made commitment of information exchange and increased transparency of 
information in order to protect existing positive reputation and concomitant market 
advantage. Hampton and Christensen (2002) believe that the cumulative pressures for 
reform will significantly reconfigure the offshore finance industry. Offshore finance 
may return onshore to the large, functional financial centers such as London and New 
York. So one purpose of our paper is to find out whether these programs against lax 
regulation, lack of transparency, tax evasion and money laundering work effectively. 
If they have already shown their effects, then the attractiveness of OFCs, tax havens 
and money laundering centers should have declined. 
The main objective of this paper is to find out the factors that affect international 
capital flows and the role of OFCs. We use two complementary dataset, bilateral 
cross-border asset holding from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and 
financial intermediation value from UNdatabase. We also use the net export of 
financial services from Zorome (2007) to complement our analysis. We are most 
interested in the behaviors of tax avoidance, tax evasion and money laundering and 
their impact on the pattern of international capital flows. To study this problem, we 
add three indicators of OFC, tax haven and money laundering haven. Our logic is as 
follows: if these places are mainly used for the illegal purposes of tax evasion and 
money laundering, they will be most likely to be used as entrepots because users who 
want to hide the nature of the money will frequently move the money from place to 
place. Then the three indicators should be only significantly related to the value of 
financial revenue with no strong relationship with asset holding; if they are used for 
the purposes of tax avoidance and investment, it takes longer time to realize the  
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benefits and these three indicators should have positive relationship with cross-border 
asset holding. 
Section 2 introduces the related concepts of offshore finance and reviews the 
existing theories and opinions. In section 3, we develop a simple model about the 
determinants of cross-border asset holding and conduct the corresponding empirical 
study. Section 4 examines the effects of related factors on the financial intermediation 
value and also on the net export of financial service. In section 5, we briefly analyze 
the welfare impact of offshore finance on the rest of the world. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related concepts and existing theories 
2.1 Definition and development of offshore finance 
 Offshore  finance  is  financial intermediation performed (primarily) for non-
resident borrowers and depositors using the currency not issued by the local authority. 
Correspondingly, offshore financial centres are defined as jurisdictions that oversee a 
disproportionate level of financial activities by non-residents (Rose and Spiegel, 
2007). Offshore financial centers offer regular commercial services, foreign currency 
trades and speculation on both the spot and forward markets, access to electronic 
funds transfer systems, asset protection by guaranteeing banking secrecy and 
anonymity, investment consulting, international tax planning and trade finance (Warf, 
2002).  
Offshore finance is essentially the efficient response of international banks to the 
policy changes by sovereign governments in many developed economies. These 
policy changes at the early stage include the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 as a response 
to the banking crisis during the Great Depression, which barred commercial banks 
from entering the investment banking business, removal of foreign exchange 
restrictions on the conversion by nonresidents of current earning in Western Europe in 
1958, the establishment of capital controls primarily by the United States in the late 
1950s and also by many OECD countries in the 1960s, and the imposition of high 
taxes particular in some OECD countries. These policy changes which in many cases 
were intended to provide governments with more control over monetary policy and to  
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curb the balance of payment deficits encouraged a shift of deposits and borrowing to 
less regulated institutions (Zorome, 2007).  
 Euro market is the earliest offshore market. Originally, US banks invested in the 
Euro market to escape the Glass-Steagall Act and only traded in assets denominated 
in US dollars. Then they operated far beyond Europe, and traded in all financial assets 
outside of the currency issuing country. One of Euro market¶s prime advantages was 
its lack of national regulations in 1960s and 1970s. Further, the Euro market lacked 
any reserve ratio requirements until 1987, when the world¶s central bankers met at the 
Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, to agree on global reserve 
standards (Warf, 2002). The shift of financial activities to Eurocurrencies gained 
considerable momentum after 1966, when U.S. money market rates rose above the 
interest rate ceiling on dollar deposits allowed by Regulation Q. The resulted credit 
crunch forced the U.S banks to seek funds in the Eurodollar market (Dufey and Giddy, 
1984). Thus throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the Eurocurrency market grew at a 
remarkable pace. 
The OFCs and the Eurocurrency market share a common history, inasmuch as 
OFCs are merely the geographical extension of the Eurocurrency market outside 
Western Europe. In the early 1970s, the geographical location of the market shifted 
from being mainly Western European to worldwide. Banks, later, securities and 
insurance firms began setting up offshore branches in a number of jurisdictions in the 
Caribbean, Latin America and Southeast Asia. It is these jurisdictions that become 
known today as offshore financial centers (Zorome, 2007). In the late 1970s and 
1980s, as the top financial centers such as London and Tokyo were undergoing far-
reaching change in the way they functioned and in the spatiality of their operations, a 
VHULHVRIQHZILQDQFLDOFHQWHUVFDPHWRDFFRXQWIRUDVLJQLILFDQWSRUWLRQRIWKHZRUOG¶V
cross-border bank claims. From the Bahamas to Luxembourg to Vanuatu, small and 
often marginal places became offshore financial centers: new and distinctive spaces 
corresponding to nodes in the circuits of offshore financial markets. So far there are 
46 OFCs identified by IMF, most of which are located in those small, remote and 
clustered islands
1.  Roberts (1995) identified five major world clusters of offshore 
                                                 
1Three distinctive characteristics used to identify OFCs are: the primary orientation of business toward 
non-residents, the favourable regulatory environment and the low-or-zero-taxation schemes (Zorome, 
2007).  
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finance, including the Caribbean (e.g. the Cayman Island, Bahamas, Panama); Europe 
(e.g. Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Andorra, San Marino); the 
Middle East (Cyprus, Lebanon, Bahrain); Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore); 
and the South Pacific (Vanuatu). Some (e.g. Switzerland) have a long history of 
facilitating banking secrecy, while some (e.g. Bahamas, Liechtenstein) have sought to 
emulate. Others (e.g. Liberia, Panama) provided escape from regulations in various 
onshore jurisdictions. Some emerged because of interstate rivalries and novel 
interpretations of taxation laws.   
2.2 Existing theories and opinions   
2.2.1 Tax avoidance or evasion and money laundering  
Seeking tax benefit is one of the most important reasons why people use OFCs. 
Many small islands that wanted to develop as OFCs began their offshore business by 
providing services for international banking corporations seeking to escape regulatory 
limitations of onshore places and to pursue tax benefits elsewhere. Bank secrecy laws, 
numbered bank accounts and a host of other barriers to the gathering of information 
can effectively impair even the most efficient auditor of the other countries (Workman, 
1982). All the technology advancements and regulatory shelters provide the chances 
for taxpayer to relieve their tax burdens.  
The first use of tax haven is for the tax evasion purpose. Tax evasion is regarded 
as an increasingly serious issue among the onshore economic entities, especially as 
electronic money has become the norm. Moreover, the jurisdictional question-who 
gets to tax-is vastly complicated. Digital counterfeiters can also take advantage of this 
situation, working anywhere and using the internet to spend currencies in any other 
places.  
Tax havens are not only used for illegal purposes. They can be used legally, like 
tax mitigation and tax avoidance. It is important for us to differentiate tax evasion and 
tax avoidance or tax mitigation. Tax mitigation is the activity that people take to 
reasonably relieve their tax burdens and is regarded as people¶s legal right. Tax 
avoidance involves the arrangement RIDWD[SD\HU¶VDIIDLUVWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIthe 
loopholes in the law, like postponement of taxes, classification of income and tax  
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arbitrage. It is legal but immoral. Tax evasion, on the other hand, involves acts 
intended to misrepresent or to conceal facts in an effort to escape lawful tax liability. 
Tax mitigation is unambiguously legal while tax evasion is clearly illegal. Legality is 
the dividing line between evasion and avoidance, but in practice the line is often 
blurry because the law governing the transactions is unclear and tax authorities may 
inappropriately characterize particular cases (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000).  
Persons intending to evade taxes can use tax havens either to hide income or as 
part of a complex scheme intended to conceal the true nature of a transaction. This is 
why tax evasion is also regarded as a form of money laundering. Due to its illicit 
nature, tax evasion money is more likely to be moved from place to place in case tax 
authorities track it down. Liquidity of laundering money is important as much as 
secrecy. As money comes in and out very quickly, it should have little impact on the 
stock variables like countries¶ international investment position or cross-border asset 
holding. But of course, this will increase the financial service revenue of the host 
countries
1. 
 In contrast, persons intent on tax mitigation and avoidance are more likely to use 
tax havens through investment or reinvestment to take advantage of the tax benefits 
legally. Apparently, this will have big impact on the cross-border asset holding. We 
take as an example how U.S. taxpayers try to avoid tax and its impact on cross-border 
asset holding. The profits of foreign subsidiaries are only subject to US taxes when 
repatriated as dividends. So firms with tax-haven profits can earn interest on their 
residual U.S. tax liability for as long as they defer repatriation of those profits. 
Suppose the foreign subsidiary has after-foreign-tax earning equal to M . The after-
U.S. tax present value of those earnings, if immediately repatriated, is 
) 1 /( ) 1 (
* W W   M , in which W is the U.S. tax rate and 
* W is the foreign tax rate. If, 
instead, the subsidiary repatriated interest as earned but not the principle, the parent 
receives an after-all-tax annual payment of  ) 1 (
* W  Mr . The present value of this 
infinite stream, discounted at the domestic after-tax discount rate of  ) 1 ( W  r , is 
r
r
M
r
r
M
j
j
*
1
*
)] 1 ( 1 [
) 1 (
 
 
 ¦
f
  W
W
. If  r r  
* , then this present value equals M . Thus, the 
subsidiary should never repatriate its principle, which just equals the present value of 
                                                 
1 In this paper, host countries are the places where capital flows into; source countries are the places 
where capital comes from.  
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the after-tax interest it generates. If  r r 
* , then foreign reinvestment obviously 
becomes less attractive, but as long as  *) 1 /( ) 1 (
*
W W   !
r
r
, the firm does better to 
reinvest its earnings abroad than it does to repatriated the earnings (Hines, Jr, and 
Rice, 1994). The kind of behavior certainly will increase the asset holding of 
American corporations in the tax havens. It is obvious that asset shifting for tax 
avoidance stays longer than that for tax evasion.  
Money laundering is another issue that is frequently mentioned when people talk 
about offshore finance. By definition, money laundering involves hiding, moving and 
investing the proceeds of criminal conduct. FATF has described laundering as a three-
stage process: the placement of funds into the financial system; the layering of funds 
to disguise their origin, perhaps by passing through several offshore and/or onshore 
jurisdictions; and the integration of the funds into the legitimate economy (Levi, 
2002). Actually, money laundering has a long history. More than 3000 years ago, 
Chinese merchants hid their wealth for fear that rulers would take the profits and 
assets they had accumulated through trade. Economic and financial globalization has 
made the life of a launderer easier. The globalization of fLQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVFRPSDQLHV¶
means that money placed in a bank branch in a less regulated jurisdiction is easily 
transferred internally within the organization to a branch in a more regulated 
jurisdiction. The high volume of legal funds circulating around the globe makes the 
movement of dirty money less conspicuous. Capital flight may take many forms, from 
smuggling to sophisticated financial deals spread out over a number of centers.  
In recent years, many offshore financial centers are criticized for facilitating 
money laundering. The FATF was established by G7 in 1989 as a result of heightened 
concern over money laundering, especially regarding the proceeds of the illegal drugs 
trade and fiscal crime. FATF identified 15 jurisdictions as uncooperative countries 
and territories in 2000
1  and also stated that countermeasures would be developed 
against those areas that do not cooperate. As a response to such events, jurisdictions 
                                                 
1 The criteria used by FATF relate to loopholes in financial regulation, excessive secrecy provisions, 
and inadequate resources for addressing the problem of money laundering. The listed countries and 
territories are the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  
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on the blacklist have subsequently enacted legislations and regulations to remedy their 
identified deficiencies (Progress Report of FATF, 2001).  
2.2.2 Regulatory environment  
Offshore financial centers started to have an impact on international financial 
markets in the early 1970s. The maintenance of historic and distortionary regulations 
on the financial sectors of industrial countries during the 1960s and 1970s was a 
major contributing factor to the growth of offshore banking and the proliferation of 
OFCs. Specially, the emergence of the offshore inter-bank market during the 1960s 
and 1970s, mainly in Europe, can be traced to the imposition of reserve requirements, 
interest rate ceilings, restrictions on the range of financial products that supervised 
institutions could offer, capital controls, and high effective taxation in many OECD 
countries. Small island states have carved a competitive niche out of this environment 
E\UHOD[LQJPDUNHGO\WKHLUUHJXODWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWIRUPLQJVPDOOµEODFNKROHV¶LQWKH
topography of regulation through which large sums of money flow. For example, the 
cUHDWLRQRIWKH ,VOHRI 0DQ¶V UHJXODWRU\ UHJLPHZDVVHHQE\PDQ\ SULYDWH VHFWRU
respondents as the building block supporting the continued growth of the offshore 
financial sector (Cobb, 2001).  
As the digital revolution allowed global capital to circulate more freely and 
rapidly, the technological barriers to moving money declined dramatically. 
Accordingly, spatial variations in the nature and degree of regulation rose in 
importance. Even small differences in regulations concerning taxes or repatriated 
profits may be sufficient to induce large quantities of capital to enter or exit particular 
places. Thus, many small states have opted to attract finance capital by deregulating 
as much as possible, lifting controls over currency exchanges, investment, repatriated 
profits, and eliminating taxes in the hope that global money, with the world as its 
oyster, will select their locale.     
Secrecy guaranteed by the legal system is another reason why people use 
offshore finance. It is self-evident that money launderers need complete 
confidentiality as they are usually criminals and their activities are illegal. It is also 
necessary for tax havens to afford some level of commercial secrecy to banking 
transactions in order to permit taxpayers to perpetrate tax evasion schemes. Most  
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nations, including non-tax havens, afford bank clientele some level of secrecy to 
protect individual privacy. However, many nations will not protect information from a 
legitimate inquiry of a foreign government, particularly when the inquiry is made 
under terms of a treaty. Most major tax havens, on the other hand, will not breach 
WKHLUZDOORIVHFUHF\HYHQZKHQDPDMRUYLRODWLRQRIDQRWKHUQDWLRQ¶VODZVPD\EH
involved. For money laundering havens, it¶s even harder to persuade government to 
make information exchange.  
Banking secrecy has its origins in the common law of Great Britain. Common 
law secrecy derives from an implied contract between a banker and his client that the 
EDQNHUZLOOWUHDWWKLVFXVWRPHU¶VDIIDLUVDVFRQILGHQWLDOIn some OFCs, it is criminal 
to divulge any information about a client¶s account. Many present OFCs are ex-
British Colonies and most of them have intensified the secrecy provision originated 
from common law (Hampton, 1994). So in our paper, we include the common law 
indicator to see its impact.  
2.2.3 The effects of distance and technology 
Recent advances in telecommunications render space and distance between 
offshore financial service provider and client largely irrelevant (Hampton and Abbott, 
1999). However, from the stable negative sign of distance in the regression on cross 
border asset holding, Rose and Spiegel (2007) argue that although the role of distance 
in asset flows is less obvious than in goods flows, it still appears to be important in the 
data. Furthermore, they set up their model based on the assumption that distance 
increases the transaction cost proportionally. Portes and Rey (2004) also find the 
negative impact of distance on cross border asset trade and they also believe the 
geography of information is still the main determinant of the pattern of international 
financial transaction but their explanation is different. As asset is weightless, distance 
does not increase the transaction cost but increases the information asymmetry 
between domestic and foreign investors and affects the efficiency of transactions.   
Those who promote the importance of face-to-face meeting argue that face-to-
face contact is a necessary element of that FHQWHU¶V competitiveness and such personal 
interaction is necessary both to create and maintain trust and confidence in the service  
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provider by service users (Warf, 2002). In this sense, distance is still a factor affecting 
transaction cost as traveling needs both time and money. 
The ways of capital markets worldwide operate were profoundly affected by the 
digital revolution. Global money dances through the world¶s fiber optic networks in 
astonishing volumes. Banks, insurance companies and securities firms, all of which 
are generally information intensive in nature, have been at the forefront of the 
construction of extensive networks, particularly a skein of fiber optic lines. Electronic 
funds transfer systems, in particular, that form the nerve centre of the international 
financial economy, allow banks to move capital around at a moment¶s notice, 
arbitraging interest rate differentials, taking advantage of favorable exchange rate and 
avoiding political unrest (Warf, 2002). Electronic money may be exchanged an 
infinite number of times without leaving a trace, making it difficult for regulatory 
authorities to track down transactions both legal and illegal. The ascendancy of 
electronic money altered the impacts of financial instruments on local economies. 
Foreign investments, for example, have shifted increasingly from Foreign Direct 
Investment to intangible portfolio investments such as stocks and bonds, a process 
that reflects the securitization of global finance.  
OFCs are used as nodes in a network by global custodians. Massive investments 
in telecommunications and data management technologies are essential to their 
competition in attracting global capital. For example, 3DQDPD¶VVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQLQ
Latin American financial markets is closely associated with its growing 
telecommunications infrastructure. The microelectronic revolution, the digitization of 
capital, and an emerging global telecommunications infrastructure centered upon fiber 
optics lines became increasingly vital to the liquidity of global capital and hence to 
the competitive position as an offshore financial center. Thus, in Panama, boosting the 
corporate telecommunications network was undertaken by the state in conjunction 
with its studied efforts to retain banks (Warf, 2002).  
2.2.4 Other issues 
The two main user categories of offshore finance are transnational corporations 
DQGWKHZRUOG¶VZHDOWKLHVWLQGLYLGXDOV+DPSWRQ The global high net worth 
individuals use offshore international private banking services offered by the largest  
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banks. Typically, International Private Banking (IPB) for wealthy customers can 
involve multi-currency bank accounts and sophisticated asset management, often 
using complex structure of offshore companies and trusts, sometimes stretching 
across several OFCs (Hampton, 1996). Through IPB, banks are providing a 
convenient, confidential and comprehensive program of personal financial counseling, 
structured to meet the investment, banking and estate planning needs of wealthy 
individuals. The concentration of wealth must be correlated with the extent of 
inequality. So in this paper we also examine the effect of the inequality which is 
represented by Gini coefficient.  
Nigh, Cho and Krishman (1986) found that the US business presence in a foreign 
country has a strong positive effect on US branch banking activity which is measured 
by the branch asset in host country. The openness of the host country to the 
establishment of new foreign bank branches does affect US branch banking 
involvement. 
As offshore finance is fickle and extraordinarily mobile, any hint of political 
instability will send it somewhere else (Roberts, 1995). So we include the political 
stability index of both host countries and source countries. We also add other 
governance indicators like government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption 
control.  
Most of the above issues caQEHVXPPDUL]HGE\+DPSWRQ¶V(1996) four spaces 
theory. Hampton used four spaces to analyze the growth of offshore finance and the 
emergence of a suitable environment for international money laundering.  First, the 
secrecy space is one of prime attractions for users of OFCs. Second, the regulatory 
VSDFHWKHEDQNVWKDWILUVWPRYHGµRIIVKRUH¶LQWRWKH&DULEEHDQLQWKHVZHUHDEOH
to exploit this regulatory space that had opened up between those jurisdictions and the 
larger mainland economies. Third, the political space, the nature of the relationship 
between offshore and its mainland onshore is an important determinant of its 
successfulness as an OFC. At present, the majority of OFCs are located either in the 
UK overseas territories or in the British Crown Dependencies. The fourth is the fiscal 
space, also known as the taxation system.  
3. The determinants of cross-border asset holding  
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3. 1 Theoretical framework 
In this section, we set up the theoretical framework based on the model of 
Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) to derive a gravity equation for international trade in 
assets. In their model, factors that decide the amount of cross border asset holding 
include population, income, expected return rate, market size and transaction cost. 
The deficiency of this model is that it does not contain the term of investment risk 
which is an essential factors in investment decision especially in the international 
market. To explicitly reveal the effect of the factors that affect investment risk, we 
introduce the term of variance of investment return rate. From this perspective, it is 
easy for us to think about using the mean-variance portfolio theory to analyze the 
factors that affect people¶s decision about asset investment overseas. It is natural to 
assume that people are rational and risk-averse. To make our analysis simpler, we also 
have the following assumptions: individuals in each country have the same utility 
function; each country just has one representative asset that is unrelated with each 
other; Individuals live for two periods.  
According to mean-variance theory, the utility function of an individual in 
country  j  is  
)) ( ), ( ( tj tj tj C V C E U U   , t=1 or 2; where  ) ( tj C E   is the expected value of 
consumption in period t  and  ) ( tj C V  is the variance of the consumption. U increases 
in  ) ( tj C E  and decreases in  ) ( tj C V . 
The total utility in the whole life is  
)) ( ), ( ( ) ( 2 2 1 2 1 j j j j j j C V C E U c U U U U E       , where ) 1 (
1
2 ij
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i
ij j R s C   ¦
 
 
) ), 1 ( ( ) (
))) 1 ( ( )), 1 ( ( ( ) (
2
1
2
1
1
1 1
1
ij
N
i
ij ij
N
i
ij j
ij
N
i
ij ij
N
i
ij j j
s r s U c U
R s V R s E U c U U
V E
E
¦ ¦
¦ ¦
   
   
   
    
  
  14 
Where  j c1 is the consumption in period 1,  j C2 is the consumption in period 2
1,  ij s is the 
investment of individual of country j in country i,  ij R is the actual return individuals 
in country  j get by investing in country i and is random,  ij r is the expected value of 
ij R , and 
2
ij V is the variance of  ij R , which here is used to represent the risks to invest 
in country i, E is the discount factor, and N is the number of host countries.  
Individuals optimize their investment to maximize their utility. So the problem 
becomes ) ), 1 ( ( ) ( max
2
1
2
1
1 , 1
ij
N
i
ij ij
N
i
ij j s c s r s U c U
ij j
V E ¦ ¦
   
  ,  
s.t.  ¦
 
  
N
i
ij j j s c y
1
1 ;  0 t ij s ;  j j c c 0 1 t ; where  j y is the wealth of the individual in 
country  j and  j c0 is the minimum consumption in period one.  
Although we can not get a closed form solution for this problem, we can see that 
ij s  is decided by j y  and factors that affect  ij r  and
2
ij V . To make things clearer, we take 
a extremely simple utility function as an example. Assume  ) ( ) ( tj tj tj C V C E U     
) ) 1 ( (
2
1
2
1
1 ij
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i
ij ij
N
i
ij j j s r s c U V E ¦ ¦
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The Lagrangian function for this maximization problem is  
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We have the following result
2: 
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1  j c1  is chosen in period 1 and is actually known.  j C2 is random and unknown in period 1. 
2 Detailed deduction can be found in the appendix B.  
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From the above result, it is not difficult to find the positive relationship between 
ij s and ij r , and negative relationship between  ij s and
2
ij V .  ij s  is a phase function of  j y . 
Let
*
j y   denote the point where  0   ij s . According to Kuhn-Tucker condition, 
as ij s can not be negative, any individuals have wealth lower than 
*
j y will not invest in 
country ibut we have to notice that
*
j y is affected by the conditions of countryiand 
country j . So the total asset investment of country j in country i 
is j j y ij j ij dy y f s N S
j
) (
* ³
f
  , where  j N  and  ) ( j y f are the population and the income 
distribution density of country j , respectively. From this model we can see cross-
border asset holding is also related to the source FRXQWU\¶VLQFRPHGLVWULEXWLRQand 
intuitively, the more people earn, the more they invest overseas. The income 
distribution reveals the extent of wealth concentration. In this paper, we use Gini 
coefficient to approximate the extent of wealth concentration. Actually, another data 
set should be better than Gini Coefficient to reflect the effect of income distribution, 
which is income share held by highest 10% or 20%. However, we only found this data 
for OECD countries. Actually, Rose and Spiegel (2007) also checked the effect of 
Gini coefficient but did not report it in their paper. We expect  ij S  have a concave 
relationship with Gini coefficient. This is because when income distribution is 
relatively equal, the increase in inequality will increase the percentage of people with 
wealth above
*
j y ; on the other hand, when income distribution is very unequal, wealth  
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will be concentrated in a few people¶s wealth and increase in inequality will decrease 
the percentage of people with wealth above
*
j y .  
Although we did not mention transaction cost in the model, actually, as ij R  return 
rate is actual return rate of investing in countryi, tax and transaction costs are already 
deducted. All the factors that cause higher transaction cost reduce ij R  and thus ij r . 
From the above model, we can see factors that affect the total cross-border asset 
holding of country j in country i include population, income level and its distribution, 
investment return rate, and investment risk of the two countries. So now we are ready 
to set up our empirical estimation equation. As gravity model is repeatedly proved to 
be powerful in explaining bilateral trade and our data is bilateral, we here have the 
similar specification:  
T EVij ij j i ij r M M S    
where ij S =asset holding of source country  j  in host countryi; 
i M = the mass control of host countryi, which is a function of GDP per capita, 
population, area and so on; 
j M = the mass control of source country j , which is a function of GDP per 
capita, population, area and so on; 
ij r =the expected return rate of investing in host country i which is affected by 
investment environment and transaction infrastructures of both source and host 
countries; 
ij V =barriers for source countries to invest in host countries. We assume the 
following form
1:  .....) exp( 3 2
1     border comlang dij ij G G V
G , where  ij d is the bilateral 
distance,  comlang and border indicate whether the two countries share the same 
language and the same border, respectively. There are also other factors that affect 
                                                 
1 This formula is used by Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) with the left hand side being transaction cost.  
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investment risk like political stability, government effectiveness, capital regulation, 
and so on.  
7KLVHTXDWLRQLVYHU\LQWXLWLYHDQGLVVLPLODUWRWKHVWDQGDUGµJUDYLW\¶HTXDWLRQ
derived in the literatures of international trade in differentiated goods (David, 
Subramanian and Tamirisa, 2007).  
3.2 Empirical study 
3.2.1 Data description 
OFCs are characterized by a proportionally high level of portfolio investment 
assets held by non-residents. They are home (legal domicile) to a large number of 
custodian entities which hold and manage securities on behalf of clients residing 
outside the OFC. From this perspective, cross-border asset holding is a good indicator 
for studying offshore financial activities. Data on international portfolio asset 
holdings have recently been published by the IMF. The IMF conducted the 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for the first time in 1997 and 
annually since 2001. The advantage of CPIS is that it provides the geographical 
breakdown of cross-border asset-holding which allows the use of gravity model.  
The first CPIS involved 20 economies and the CPIS 2001 expanded to 
participation of 67 source economies including the offshore financial centers. In each 
case, the bilateral positions of the source countries in 223 destination 
countries/territories are reported. In this paper we use the 6-year panel from 2001 to 
2006. The flaws of this data were already mentioned in the paper of Rose and Spiegel 
(2007), of which a large number of missing values is most salient.  
Explanation of independent variables is presented below. Data sources can be 
found in Appendix A. We put in parentheses what these variables might affect. 
ij dist =distance between country i and country j (informational asymmetry and 
transaction cost); 
i inba =international internet bandwidth in host countryi , which is defined as the 
maximum amount of data per unit time that can be transmitted from one node to the  
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other. We use this variable to stand for the extent of the telecommunication 
development (Transaction efficiency); 
i openness =export-to-GDP-ratio + import-to-GDP-ratio of host country i 
(informational asymmetry); 
i ofc =1 if host country i   is an offshore financial center and 0 if not (investment 
environment); 
i taxhaven =1 if host country i is a tax haven and 0 if not (investment environment)
1; 
i moneyl =1 if host country i   is money laundering haven and 0 if not (investment 
environment)
2; 
ij comlang =1 if country i  and country j use the same language and 0 if not 
(informational asymmetry); 
ij border =1 if country i  and country j share the common border and 0 if not 
(informational asymmetry); 
ij comcol = 1 if country i and country j were colonized by the same country and 0 if not 
(informational asymmetry); 
i island =1 if host country i is an island and 0 if not (mass control); 
i landl =1 if host country i is landlocked and 0 if not (mass control); 
i area =the area of host country i (mass control); 
                                                 
1The 1998 IMF report describes four key factors to determine whether a jurisdiction is a tax haven: first, 
whether the jurisdiction imposes no or only nominal taxes; second, whether there are laws or 
administrative practices that prevent the effective exchange of information for tax purposes with other 
governments; third, whether there is lack of transparency; whether there is an absence of a requirement 
that the activity be substantial. According to these criteria, the 2000 report lists 35 nations or territories 
as tax havens (The review process, OECD 2000).  
2 There are totally 29 nations or territories listed by FATF as money laundering havens that do not 
criminalize laundering or that have serious deficiencies in their banking regulation (Joseph Kahn, 
2000).  
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j area =the area of source country j (mass control); 
i polstab =the political stability index of host country i (investment risk); 
i goveff =the government effectiveness of host country i (Investment environment); 
i regqual =regulation quality of host country i (Investment environment); 
i rulelaw =rule of law in host countryi, the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society (Investment environment); 
i r corrupcont =corruption control in host country i , which measures the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of 
FRUUXSWLRQDVZHOODV³FDSWXUH´RIWKHVWDWHby elites and private interests. The higher 
this indicator is, the more corrupt the government is (Investment environment); 
i commonl =1 if host country i uses common law legal system and 0 if not (secrecy of 
investment);  
i gr= GDP growth rate in host country i (investment environment); 
i gr2 = square of  i gr 
i gr 1 _ = GDP growth rate of last year in host countryi; 
i gr 12 _ = square of  i gr 1 _ ; 
i gini =Gini coefficient of host countryi , which we use as an income distribution 
indicator; 
i gini2 =square of  i sgini ; 
Variables of source country  j have corresponding meanings.  
3.2.2 Estimation of bilateral cross-border asset holding  
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The specific estimation equation is stated below:  
ij
j i j i j i j
i j i j i j i j
i j i ij ij ij ij j
i j i j i j i
j i j j i i ij
t t t t t
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We estimate this equation with conventional OLS, with year-specific fixed effect. 
We add time dummies to control for aggregate shocks such as a world business cycle, 
movement in the world interest rate, global capital market shocks or other global 
events. We do not introduce country-pair fixed effect as doing so will greatly reduce 
the degree of freedom. Besides, we believe distance and other variables which are 
constant over all observations for a given country pair will pick up most of the fixed 
effects. We did not adopt the fix-HIIHFW³ZLWKLQ´HVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVHLWKHU$OWKRXJK
this method provides more consistent estimates by controlling for the influences from 
omitted country-specific factors, one drawback of this fixed effect approach is that 
since the fixed effect estimator exploits variation over time, the estimation for time-
invariant factors such as distance, area, land border, and the common language cannot 
be obtained. Random effects panel estimation is not theoretically appropriate for our 
data, which are not drawn randomly from a larger population. Thus, our estimation 
just simply pooled the time-series and cross-section data.  
 We performed 4 estimations and results are tabulated together in Table 1. h or s 
in parenthesis indicates whether the variable is of host country or source country. We 
use the robust variance estimates, as Breusch-Pagan test suggests heteroscedasticity 
problem in normal OLS estimation. Model1 is just as the above specification. In 
model2, we added GDP growth rate and Gini coefficients. Observing our data, we can 
find data of cross-border asset holding include a lot of zero observations which will be 
randomly dropped in log-linear model. Random dropping will probably lead to bias or 
inconsistency problems. To cope with this problem, we did another two 
corresponding estimations model3 and model4 with 0 and too small values replaced 
with 0.01. This method was also used in Rose and Spiegel (2007) to solve the 
problem of zero values in log-linear model.   
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Table1    Bilateral cross border asset holding (h: host country; s: source country) 
Variable  model1 model2 model3  model4 
lgdppc (h)  1.29*** 1.35*** .795***  .787*** 
lpop (h)  .732*** .78***  .735***  .766*** 
lgdppc (s)  1.98*** 2.38*** 1.18***  1.58*** 
lpop (s)  .788*** 1***  .489***  .524*** 
larea (h)  .192*** .178*** .133***  .126*** 
larea (s)  .0449** -.0561*  .0941*** .202*** 
linba (h)  .0538*** .0523**  .276*** .232*** 
linba (s)  .0549** -.0627*  .0816***  -.0799*** 
openness (h)  .00426*** .0049*** .0008* .00207*** 
openness (s)  .00627*** .00705*** .00398***  .00501*** 
ofc (h)  .653*** .591*** 1.02***  .679*** 
ofc (s)  .761*** .746*** 1.43***  1.32*** 
taxhaven (h)  1.26*** 1.15***  0.0158  .576*** 
taxhaven (s)  .689*** 1.17***  0.0694  2.15*** 
moneyl (h)  -.425*** -.22*  -.261***  -.309*** 
moneyl (s)  1.16*** .705***  -0.00141  -.704*** 
ldist  -.893*** -.941***  -1***  -1.14*** 
comlang  .699*** .825*** .774***  .586*** 
border  .876*** .79*** 1.2***  1.03*** 
comcol  1.28*** 1.63*** .565***  .585*** 
island (h)  .205*** .158*** .277***  .206*** 
island (s)  .423*** .343*** .354***  .168*** 
landl (h)  .084** -0.026  -0.012 -0.0226 
landl (s)  .09*** 0.0565  .127***  .182*** 
polstab (h)  -.00614*** -.00499**  .0107***  .0123*** 
polstab (s)  0.00058 -0.00027  -.00717***  -.0156*** 
goveff (h)  0.00117 .00949**  -.00619**  .00724** 
goveff (s)  -.0517*** -.0393*** -.0245*** 0.00853 
regqual (h)  .0276*** .0346*** .0202***  .0234*** 
regqual (s)  0.00515 -0.00249  .0148***      0.00454 
rulelaw (h)  -0.00508 -0.00756 -0.00449  -.0107*** 
rulelaw (s)  .0499*** .0373*** .0347***  0.00031     
corrupcontr (h)  -.00998*** -.0234*** .00436* -.00558* 
corrupcontr (s)  -0.00735 0.00941 -.00738*  0.0132*   
commonl (h)  -.274*** -.314*** -.217***  -.314*** 
commonl (s)  -0.094 -0.0654  -.537***  -0.119 
t2  0.0604 .185**  .131**  0.0701 
t3  -.196*** 0.00063  -.2***  -0.0355 
t4  -.613*** -.369*** -.668***  -.298*** 
t5  -.804*** -.63***  -1.21***  -.829*** 
t6  -.743*** -.623*** -.856***  -.515*** 
gini (s)   0.0343      .0446* 
gini2 (s)   -0.00026   -.00073** 
gr (h)   -.041***    -.105*** 
gr2 (h)   -0.00113    .00194*** 
gr_1 (h)   -.058***    -.0706*** 
gr_12 (h)   .00402***   .0018*** 
gr (s)   -0.018    -0.00038 
gr2 (s)   .00343**    -1.90E-05 
gr_1 (s)   0.0141    -0.00519 
gr_12 (s)   .0056***    -0.00139* 
_cons  -36.7*** -44.1*** -24.1***  -27.8*** 
Adjusted
2 R   0.613 0.652 0.625  0.651 
rmse  2.26 2.18 2.94  2.88 
N  12691 8572  28444  19263 
      Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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On the whole, most estimates are satisfactory. All the estimations explain more 
than 60% of the variance. We tried to add more explanatory variables like corporate 
tax rate, capital gain tax rate and income tax rate, and so on; however, as our model 
involves too many pairs of countries, data collection becomes the most difficult 
problem. Adding other variables greatly shrinks the sample size and makes the 
estimation unstable. So we give up this attempt and only use the variables in Table1.  
All these estimations deliver some sensible estimates. For instance, all the mass 
controls have positive coefficients, which means higher population and GDP per 
capita in either host or source countries encourage greater cross border asset holding. 
Especially that higher GDP per capita in source countries increases asset holding is 
consistent with our model. Geography matters in the sense that shared land border, 
language, and colonizer raises cross-border asset holding, while long distance lowers 
cross-border asset holding. Given other conditions, islands and land locked countries 
or territories are more likely to be involved in cross-border asset transaction. All these 
effects are sensible and statistically significant at conventional significant levels.  
  As for the effect of distance, we want to say more. With technological advances 
such as internet, the cost to obtain information about possible suppliers on the other 
side of the globe has declined substantially. Today it is virtually costless to call 
anywhere in the world using internet long-distance facilities, whereas the cost of a 3-
min telephone call from New York to London today is less than $1, comparatively in 
1930 it was $244.65. So intuitively, distance is less a barrier now than before. Besides, 
financial asset is weightless and most transactions today are done without moving the 
real money.  
However, our estimation still shows a negative effect of distance on cross-border 
asset holding. This result is almost the same as that of Rose and Spiegel (2007) and 
that of Portes and Rey (2005). Rose and Spiegel (2007) attribute the negative effect to 
transaction cost which they think is positively and proportionately related to distance. 
Their conclusion is that although the costs of shifting assets offshore have fallen over 
time, they remain non-trivial. In contrast, Portes and Rey think that as asset is 
weightless, asset shifting is costless and the negative effect of distance is not due to 
the increase in transaction cost but the information asymmetry it causes. Information 
asymmetry is positively correlated with distance: the cost of traveling is higher for  
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long distances; cultural differences are likely to be stronger, and business links 
weaker. Actually, our regressions also find some evidence of the effect of information 
asymmetry. As previously said, Breusch-Pagan test suggests heteroscedasticity 
problem in normal OLS estimation. Although we change to the robust standard error 
estimates, we still find a striking relationship between the residuals and distance.   
Figure 1   Relationship between residuals and log of distance 
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Figure 1 implies that the volatility of the error terms increases in log of distance. 
This means the heteroscedasticity problem is not pure but impure, caused by some 
omitted variables that are positively related with distance. Portes and Rey use bilateral 
telephone call traffic as a direct measure of information transmission and found that 
when added to the regression, this variable is significant, well signed and reduces the 
coefficient of distance. This confirms the idea that distance is more related to 
information asymmetry rather than transaction cost. When distance increases, people 
in the source countries know less and less about the host country so the information 
asymmetry increases. Information asymmetry will increase investment uncertainty 
and thus investment risk people perceive. As people generally are risk averse, under 
the same expected return, people will invest less. This result means the estimated 
coefficient of distance in our model is biased. In this paper, we also tried to use data 
of bilateral telephone call traffic to approximate information asymmetry; however, 
data is not available for the period from 2001 to 2006.   
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Nowadays, e-money dances from place to place without real money moved, so 
the impact of telecommunication infrastructure on asset transaction cost becomes 
more important. Furthermore, telecommunication affects people¶s ability to search for 
information and transaction efficiency. Here, we use international internet bandwidth 
to represent the condition of telecommunication infrastructure. The internet 
bandwidth is a measure of the capacity of information carrying. Higher bandwidth 
implies better telecommunication conditions. From Table1, we see international 
internet bandwidth is significantly and positively related to cross border asset holding, 
which implies that the advancement of telecommunication technology is one of the 
most important factors that affects international capital flows and countries with better 
telecommunication infrastructure are more competitive in attracting asset investment.  
Higher openness index which is measured by the trade-to-GDP-ratio means 
higher connection with the rest of the world, so it reduces the informational 
asymmetry and leads to higher cross border asset holding. The result would be better 
if we could get the bilateral export and import data between two countries. Anyway, 
our estimation still reveals the effect.  From Table1, we can see openness in both host 
countries and source countries is positively and significantly related to cross-border 
asset holding. 
The most important result in our estimation is about tax haven and money 
laundering. Our result about these two indicators are quite different from the result of 
Rose and Spiegel (2007) which shows that both tax haven and money laundering 
indicators of host countries have positive and significant effects on cross border asset 
holding while that of source countries not. And their conclusion is that both tax 
havens and money laundering centers attract more investment by facilitating illegal 
and bad behaviors and countries identified as tax havens and money launderers are 
more likely to be OFCs, encouraging tax evasion and nefarious activity in the 
neighboring source countries; a primary motivation for investors in moving assets 
offshore is circumventing domestic tax laws or other illegal activities. Actually, we 
replicated their model using data of 2001 and 2002 and got the same results as theirs. 
The result does not change even when we use six years¶ data from 2001 to 2006. One 
possible reason for the differences is the inclusion of time fixed effect in our paper 
because in Rose and Spiegel (2007) the time fixed effect is not obvious for just two  
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years¶ data; however, when we drop the time dummies in our model, we still get the 
similar result as Table 1. Another possible reason is that we include more explanatory 
variables. When we use data of only 2001 and 2002, our results about OFC, tax haven 
and money laundering indicators do not change much from Table 1. So our 
conclusion is that the difference is mainly caused by the different variables included.  
Our result of all the four estimations shows that coefficients of tax haven in both 
host countries and source countries are positive and strongly significant at 1% 
significance level. This means tax havens attract investment and at the same time also 
invest more overseas. This is sensible as cross border capital flow are more likely to 
EHDWWUDFWHGE\IRUHLJQFRXQWULHV¶SUHIHUHQWLDOtax policy. The positive coefficient of 
tax haven indicator of the source is also sensible, as usually tax havens are specialized 
places in financial service with comprehensive financial expertise. When international 
capital flows in, experts will make reinvestment to maximize their profits.  
As for money laundering, the result is even more impressive. The coefficient of 
money laundering indicator of host countries is negative and that of the source 
countries is positive. This means if a country is known as a money laundering center, 
it will get less investment and have more capital outflow. At the first sight, this result 
seems unreasonable. The prevailing idea is that money laundering havens attract 
capital inflows due to its lax regulation and strict protection of banking secrecy. 
However, we think our result is sensible because the bad reputation of money 
laundering centers may scare the investors away. Especially in recent years when 
global efforts in fighting against money laundering has been intensified. When a place 
is famous for its role in facilitating money laundering, it will draw more eyes from 
ERWKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶UHJXODWLRQFRPPLWWHHV(YHQ
the money launderers for the illegal purposes do not dare to put their money in such 
places for a long time.  
OFC indicators in the model show very good result. Countries indicated as an 
offshore financial center get more investment in their asset and invest more in other 
countries. As we already include tax and money laundering haven indicators in our 
model, OFC indicator is more likely to capture the impacts of other characteristics of 
offshore finance rather than tax issues or money laundering. Offshore financial 
centers not only provide preferential fiscal and regulatory environment which attract  
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investment but also are endowed with a pool of financial expertise which offer them 
great advantage in international financial intermediation. Due to their specialization in 
financial industry, they play an important role in global capital flow.  
Estimates of governance indicators are not very stable. On the whole, our 
estimation shows that good governance in the host countries attracts investment while 
bad governance in the source countries drives capital to flow out. Although our 
estimation about the effect of the political stability is not very stable, political stability 
LV DOZD\V UHJDUGHG DV DQ LPSRUWDQW IDFWRU LQ SHRSOH¶V GHFLVLRQ RI international 
investment. Bad corruption control in host countries has a negative impact since it 
indicates a bad investment environment. In the real world, money comes from 
briberies are more likely to be shifted offshore. It is estimated in 1999, corrupt 
political leaders stashed away US$20 billion in Swiss bank accounts, where secrecy is 
guaranteed (The Economist, 16 January 1999).  However, our model does not show 
strong evidence of this. A reasonable explanation can be that action against corruption 
in corrupt countries is less effective. 
%DQNLQJVHFUHF\JXDUDQWHHVWKHFRQILGHQWLDOLW\RIFOLHQWV¶LQIRUPDWLRQThis is 
very important especially for those who use offshore finance for illegal purpose. As 
common law of Great Britain has the origin for banking secrecy, we include common 
law indicator in our model. However, we find the effect is negative. One possible 
explanation is that common law indicator is not sufficient to reveal the extent of 
banking secrecy. Another possible explanation is the global requirement for the 
information exchange. A jurisdiction too strict in banking secrecy may suffer from 
economic sanction imposed by other countries, like the U.S. or the European 
countries. Actually, OFCs always face the problem of balancing between secrecy and 
transparency. Should their laws and regulations offer too much secrecy, the center 
may suffer as reputations as a haven for illegal funds, a force that may discourage 
legitimate investors. Conversely, should the center prove too transparent to auditors 
and international watchdogs, even investors with legal assets may be frightened off. 
So it has to balance between confidentiality and transparency in order to lure investors 
and at the same time remain sufficiently legitimate in the eyes of the global banking 
(Warf, 2002).   
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Our model in section 2.1 implies that income distribution in the source countries 
should have an impact on investment overseas. Previous studies also declare that 
offshore finance is more likely to be used by the well-educated and wealthy people. 
So here we use the Gini coefficient to examine this effect. The Gini coefficient is a 
measure of statistical dispersion most prominently used as a measure of inequality of 
income distribution or inequality of wealth distribution. A low Gini indicated more 
equal income or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient indicates more 
unequal distribution and more money is in the hands of the minority wealthy people. 
Gini coefficient is included in estimations model2 and model4. Although coefficients 
in model2 are not significant, coefficients of the first-order of Gini coefficient are 
positive while that of second-order are negative. This means bilateral cross-border 
asset holding first increase in the source countries¶ Gini coefficients and then decrease 
after a given point. This concave relationship has been predicted in our theoretical 
analysis in section 3.1. Investment of source country  j  in  host  country  i should 
increase in the extent of inequality when it is very low and decrease in it when it is too 
high. :HGLGQ¶WDGGWKH*LQLFRHIILFLHQWRIKRVWFRXQWUies for two reasons. First, we do 
not think the income distribution of host countries matters. Second, as the data of Gini 
coefficient of host countries has a lot of missing values, including it in the estimation 
will greatly reduce our sample size.  
Estimates of the GDP growth rates show very interesting results. We include the 
GDP grow rate and its first-order lag in our estimation model2 and model4. We use 
them to indicate the condition of investment environment and expect that of host 
countries should have a positive effect. Our results show that both current grow rate 
and its lag have negative signs but their squares have positive signs. This means GDP 
growth rate has a positive relationship with cross border asset holding only after a 
given point. Some people may concern about the correlation between Gini coefficient 
and GDP. Our data show that this concern is not necessary as the correlation 
coefficient is only 0.057.  
3.2.3 Dynamic effects 
 Time fixed effects are very significant and more importantly, all coefficients of 
the time dummies show negative signs and on the whole, become smaller and smaller  
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as time passes. This is quite important because it means given other factors unchanged, 
the cross border asset holding is decreasing during these years. This may be caused by 
three factors: competition among host and source countries, financial reforms carried 
out in industrial countries and global cooperative effort against tax evasion, money 
laundering and lax financial regulation.  
By the end of the 1990s, some major industrial countries began to make similar 
incentives available on their home territory. For example, the U.S. established in 1981, 
in major U.S. cities, the so-called International Banking Facilities (IBFs). Later, Japan 
allowed the creation of the Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) with similar 
characteristics. At the same time, supervisory authorities, and to some extent tax 
authorities were adopting the principle of consolidation which reduced the incentives 
for banks to carry on business outside their principal jurisdiction. As a result, the 
relative advantage of OFCs for conventional banking has become less attractive to 
industrial countries, although the tax advantages for asset management appear to have 
grown in importance (IMF background paper, 2000). Errico and Musalem (1999) 
already predicted that offshore banking might lose appeal for the financial institutions 
of advanced economies, operating in liquid, increasingly competitive, and well-
regulated financial centers. As a recent result of distortionary regulatory framework 
being dismantled in favor of competition under prudential supervision, and capital 
account convertibility being increasingly embraced, the distinction between onshore 
and offshore banking has become progressively blurred in industrial countries. 
The second reason is that since the late 1990s, the OECD countries and other 
international institutions have taken out a series of measures against tax evasion and 
money laundering. In 2000, OECD identified over thirty countries as engaging in the 
harmful tax evasion practices. Countries on the lists were given deadlines to change 
their policies in order to avoid economic sanctions. The G7 have also pursued 
initiatives against money laundering practices, including the founding the Financial 
Action Task Force. All the jurisdiction put on the blacklist of uncooperative tax haven 
of OECD or the blacklist of uncooperative countries and territories of FATF not only 
suffers from the bad reputation but also possible economic sanction from other 
countries.   
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The declining coefficients of time dummies implies that either industrial 
FRXQWULHV¶ SROLF\ FKDQJHV RU JOREDO effort in combating tax evasion and money 
laundering has curbed international capital flows. To study the effects on offshore 
havens, we allow the parameter shifting in the estimation. The part that we are 
interested in is presented in Table2
1  in which tt is the interaction of tax haven 
indicator and time indicator, mt is the interaction of money laundering indicator and 
time indicator and ofct is the interaction of OFC indicator and time indicator. 
Table2    cross-border asset holding: allowing parameter shift 
 Variable  model21  model22   
  ofc     (h)  .485***  .658***   
 ofct2    (h)  -0.203  -0.0137   
 ofct3    (h)  0.199  .634***   
 ofct4    (h)  0.275  .676***   
 ofct5    (h)  .632***  .47**   
 ofct6    (h)  1.17***  1.34***   
  ofc   (s)  .967***  .731***   
 ofct2    (s)  -.35**  .534***   
 ofct3    (s)  -.294*  1.18***   
 ofct4    (s)  -.301*  .662***   
 ofct5    (s)  -0.127  .843***   
 ofct6    (s)  -.491*  .966***   
 taxhaven    (h)  1.9***  .644***   
 tt2  (h)  0.326  0.233   
 tt3  (h)  -.975**  -1.38***   
 tt4  (h)  -1.11***  -1.19***   
 tt5  (h)  -1.5***  -.971***   
 tt6  (h)  -1.95**  -1.43*   
 taxhaven    (s)  1.3***  2.3***   
 tt2    (s)  -0.33  -2***   
 tt3    (s)  -0.641  -1.92***   
 tt4    (s)  -.981**  -3.39***   
 tt5    (s)  -.912**  -2.27***   
 tt6    (s)  0  0   
 moneyl  (h)  -.715***  -.368*   
 mt2  (h)  -0.177  -0.212   
 mt3  (h)  .618**  0.41   
 mt4  (h)  .501*  0.193   
 mt5  (h)  .476*  0.132   
 mt6  (h)  0.57  0.651   
 moneyl  (s)  0.00713  0.21   
 mt2    (s)  1.03***  0.27   
 mt3    (s)  1.09***  0.317   
 mt4    (s)  1.56***  -.609***   
 mt5    (s)  1.54***  -.739***   
 mt6    (s)  4.21***  4.24***   
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Satisfactorily, Table2 shows that the importance of tax havens is declining which 
is reflected by the declining coefficients of the interaction term of tax haven and time 
                                                 
1 The complete result can be found in appendix C. See table 2B.   
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dummies. The coefficients of the interaction term of money laundering indicator and 
time dummies are increasing as time passes which implies that countries indicated as 
money laundering centers are seeing more and more capital outflow. However, the 
coefficients of the interactions of ofc and time dummies do not show declining trend. 
According to different functions, there are three types of OFCs. Primary OFCs are 
large international full service centers with advanced settlement and payments 
systems, operating in liquid regional markets where both the sources and uses of 
funds are available. Secondary OFCs differ from primary OFCs in that they 
intermediate funds in and out of their region, according to whether the region has a 
deficit or surplus of funds. Booking OFCs do not engage in the regional 
intermediation of funds, but rather serve as registries for transactions arranged and 
managed in other jurisdictions. Most tax and money laundering havens belong to the 
second and third types. So coefficients related to tax and money laundering are more 
likely to capture the effects on the second and third type OFCs while coefficient of 
OFC indicators captures the effect on the first type, primary and functional OFCs.  
Combined with the previous studies, our conclusion about this issue is that 
global cooperation against tax evasion and money laundering has already showed its 
impact. According to Michael Levi (2002), money laundering costs allegedly rose 
from 6 to 8 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to up to 20 percent by the mid-1990s. 
This confirms the prediction of Hampton and Christensen (2002) that initiatives 
against tax evasion and money laundering practices will significantly reconfigure the 
offshore finance and push capital to the big and functional financial centres or back 
³onshore´.  Our result shows that although tax havens and money laundering havens 
are losing their attractiveness gradually, offshore finance still has its own advantages. 
This also confirms the idea that offshore finance is not only used for the dubious 
things.  
3.2.4 Multilateral approach 
We now corroborate our key findings from the bilateral cross border asset 
holding with a multilateral approach. The dependent variable is the total amount of 
asset investment in host country from all the source countries. Regression functions 
have the similar specification as the bilateral one but there are some changes. We use 
the indicator of world main languages to reflect the language effect.  As for distance,  
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we replace it with the relative distance rdist which measures the relative distance of 
the countries to the rest of the world. rdist  is GDP-weighted-distance first proposed 
by Wei (1996). It is computed in the following way:  ¦ ¦
 
j
j
j
j ij
i Y
Y dist
rdist , where  j  is 
the number of source countries.  As time fixed effect is not very obvious in these 
estimations, we do not include time dummies in this estimation.  
Table3        Total cross border asset investment in host countries 
 Variable  modelh1  modelh2  modelh3  modelh4   
 lgdppc  1.22***  1.29***  1.29***  1.42***   
 lpop  .938***  1***  1.17***  1.22***   
 larea  .162***  .118**  .127**  0.0805  
 linba  .191***  .146***  .222***  .192***   
 openness  .0054***  .00937***  .00514***  .00902***   
 ofc  0.3  0.357  0.509  0.568  
 taxhaven  1.32***  1.04**  1.71***  1.54***   
 moneyl  0.325  0.155  0.603  0.256  
 lrdist  .953**  .846**  1.14**  .94*   
 island  -0.0635  -.208*  -0.137  -.263*   
 landl  -.287***  -.377***  -.499***  -.539***   
 polstab  -0.00576  -.0153***  -0.00481  -0.00946  
 goveff  .0295***  .0378***  0.0152  .0234*   
 regqua  .0345***  .0203***  .0654***  .0484***   
 rulelaw  -0.00237  0.0135  -0.0166  -0.0035  
 corrupcontr  -.0171*  -.0205**  -0.0146  -.0245**   
 commonl  -0.222  -0.305  -0.276  -.663***   
 gr    -.0621**    -.0489*   
 gr2    -0.00066   -0.00035  
 gr_1    -.0385*    -.0573**   
 gr_12    .00359**   -0.00053  
 English    0.16    .543**   
 French    0.0358    -0.0802  
 Spanish    .385*    0.321  
 Portugese    -0.221    -0.086  
 Arabic    -1.28***    -1.01***   
 German    -0.525    -0.47  
 Dutch    -0.469    -1.06*   
 Chinese    -1.58***    -1.61***   
 _cons  -31.4***  -30.9***  -37.6***  -36.2***   
  Adjusted
2 R   0.816 0.833 0.791  0.806   
 rmse  1.8  1.72  2.32  2.23  
 N  789  776  863  848  
     Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table3 confirms most of the findings in the bilateral estimation of Table1. For 
example, GDP per capita, population, higher internet bandwidth, and openness 
increase the asset investment in host countries. A jurisdiction is attractive for 
investment if it provides tax benefits and has good political environment. There are 
also some differences from Table1. Indicators of money laundering and OFC are not  
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significant any more. One possible explanation is that OFC and money laundering 
indicators are highly correlated with the tax haven indicators. The correlation between 
OFC indicator and tax haven indicator is as high as 0.81. The effects of OFCs and 
money laundering havens are captured by the tax haven indicator. Another reason can 
be that the multilateral model is not as good as the gravity model in studying this 
problem, as the aggregate data can easily hide some information that can be revealed 
in the gravity model.  
The most striking result in Table3 is that distance has a positive coefficient in 
multilateral estimation, which means when a country is far from the rest of the world 
the investment from the rest of world is higher. It seems contradictory as we have 
already shown in Table1 distance has a negative effect on cross-border asset holding, 
but it is consistent with the fact that a lot of the tax havens or offshore financial 
centers are located in the remote and small islands
1. According to the rough 
estimation of the economists, nearly half of the world¶s capital flows through remote 
and small places (BBC news, 6 May 2008). 
But how can we explain the two seemingly contradictory results? We use an 
extreme but simple example to illustrate how this happens. Assume there are two host 
countries (H1 and H2) and two source countries (S and B). Here S is the smaller 
source country and B is bigger country. They are geographically distributed as 
following: 
   Source 
Host 
S B 
H1 100  10000 
H2 10000  100 
This means H1 is closer to the smaller economy and far from the bigger 
economy while H2 is closer to the bigger economy and far from the smaller economy. 
                                                 
1 For the relationship between relative distance and OFC indicators, see Figure 2 and Figure 3 in 
appendix C. The positive relationship is not very obvious but we still can see some successful OFCs 
like Nauru, Marshall Island, Samoa, Vanuatu, etc. are far away from the rest of world. Relationship 
between relative distance and tax haven or money laundering haven is similar.   
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To make our analysis simple, we assume the following simple gravity function: 
E D D
ij j i ij dist S H S
2 1   , where  i H  here stands for the host country i¶VHFRQRPLFIDFWRUV
that have impact on the asset investment from other countries and it can be either  1 H  
or  2 H ;  j S  LV WKH VRXUFH FRXQWULHV¶ HFRQRPLF IDFWRUV WKDW KDYH LPSDFW RQ WKHLU
investment in other countries and it can be either S or B.  
For the multiple problem, we assume
J T
i i i rdist H TS   , where  i rdist  is the GDP-
weighted distance from host country i to two source countries.  
So we have the following functions: 
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As we assume  21 12 22 11 dist dist dist dist       and  0  E ,  2 1 TS TS   if  2 1 H H d ; it 
is also possible for  1 TS to be bigger than  2 TS  when  2 1 H H !  but  1 H must be big  
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enough to offset the disadvantage caused by the remoteness to the big country. So 
although 2 1 rdist rdist ! , it is possible for TS to be positively related to rdist  while the 
relationship between distance and bilateral asset holding is negative. This means other 
factors like preferential tax policy can easily remedy the disadvantage of the 
remoteness and marginality. There is one thing we would like to point out. The 
relation between distance and asset holding in gravity model is causal while that in the 
multilateral model is just factual.  
4. The determinants of financial intermediation  
About the relationship between financial intermediation and cross-border asset 
holding, Zorome (2007) makes the following statement. Exports of financial services 
are generally matched by underlying capital flows from partner countries, which in 
turn, affects the assets and liabilities position. Based on accounting identity, every 
cross border capital flow is matched by a change in the assets and liabilities positions 
of the countries involved. These positions (stocks) are the result of past external 
transactions measured at current market price. In tracking these positions for various 
countries, one would expect countries or jurisdictions with the biggest stocks of assets 
to have been the ones that registered the largest flows of financial services over time 
and as a result, exported the most financial services to nonresidents for a given period. 
However, we do not agree the above statement completely. If capital flows for 
the investment purpose, then the above statement holds; but if capital flows only for 
temporary purpose like money laundering or speculation, then capital will come and 
go very quickly without affecting the stock magnificently but increasing the revenue 
from financial services. If tax havens, money laundering centers or offshore financial 
centers are used as investment places, the three indicators should have positive 
relationship with cross-border asset holding. If they are used only as an entrepot for 
temporary storage of funds, then financial intermediation or export of financial 
service should be higher if a place is tax haven, money laundering center or offshore 
financial center while cross border asset holding should not be obviously affected.  
So here we use financial intermediation value and net export of financial service 
to complement our analysis of cross-border asset holding. Data of financial  
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intermediation used here is a sub-item of value added in UN database, of which we 
use five years from 2001 to 2005. As for net export ratio of financial services, it is got 
from Zorome (2007). Net export ratio is a good indicator which can well reflect the 
definition that financial activity in OFCs is mainly provided to non-residents. 
However, we only have one year¶s data which only includes 88 countries of 2003.  
We did three estimations. Estimation fin is the log-linear estimation of financial 
intermediation; fin_ratio is the estimation of financial intermediation over GDP ratio; 
and exp_ratio is the estimation of the net export ratio of financial service to GDP. The 
result is tabulated in Table4. The independent variables are the same as in bilateral 
and multilateral estimation. We do not include the time dummies as they are not 
jointly significant. 
Table4 financial intermediation and net export ratio of financial service 
 Variable  fin  fin_ratio  exp_ratio   
 Lgdppc  -0.0127  -20.1***  1.02*   
 lpopulation  .769***  -3.07  0.544   
 Larea  .0816*  6.36**  -0.079   
 Linba  .26***  -3.8  -0.434   
 openness  0.00124  .294***  .0157**   
 Ofc  .904***  27.2  2.41**   
 taxhaven  0.421  -10.7  -0.106   
 Moneyl  -.507*  -54.2***  -1.11   
 Island  .333***  22.6***  0.241   
 Landl  -0.0644  -17***  1.05**   
 Polstab  0.00161  -.73**  -0.0232   
 Goveff  .025**  1.97***  0.0322   
 Regqua  -0.0083  -0.213  -0.0306   
 Rulelaw  0.00298  1.18*  -0.00816   
 corrupcontr 0.0109  -1.15**  0.0313   
 Commonl  -0.128  -29**  -1.32   
 English  0.205  -9.24  0.397   
 French  -0.255  -1.23  -0.117   
 Spanish  .427**  -14.9  0.13   
 Portugese  2.24***  109***  0.465   
 Arabic  .513*  -33.8**  -1.1   
 German  0.228  4.22  -2.04   
 Dutch  0.265  -17.5  -1.22   
 Chinese  -0.361  -72.7**  -3.26*   
 _cons  3.89***  106  -14.8*   
  Adjusted 
2 R   0.862 0.315 0.149   
 Rmse  0.898  56.2  2.2   
 N  299  299  88   
 Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Zorome (2007) defines an OFC as a country or jurisdiction that provides 
financial services to non-residents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and 
the financing of its domestic economy. This implies an OFC jurisdiction should have  
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a bigger financial sector and export more financial service to other countries. From 
Table4, we see the evidence of this definition. Estimations fin and exp_ratio show that 
OFC jurisdictions generate higher financial intermediation and export more financial 
services to other countries. Estimation fin_ratio also shows positive effect although 
not significant.  
We did not see positive and significant coefficients of tax haven as in the 
bilateral and multilateral estimation of cross-border asset holding. This implies people 
intended to gain tax benefit use tax haven as an investment place rather than an 
entrepot that is only for the temporary storage of fund. Like in the cross-border asset 
holding model, money laundering centres lose financial business due to their bad 
reputation.  
Political indicators are not as significant as in the asset holding model but on the 
whole, it is still the case that good governance guarantees the development of 
financial sector. The reason for less significance can be that business of financial 
intermediation is more likely to take advantage of the bad political environment or 
legal loopholes to facilitate money laundering or tax evasion. This effect partly trades 
off the attractiveness of good governance. Common law indicator still has negative 
effect or insignificant effect.  
Now we can combine our analysis with the model of cross-border asset holding. 
We said tax avoidance is more likely to increase the investment in the host countries 
than tax evasion while tax evasion is more likely to increase the revenue from 
financial intermediation or the export of financial service. As tax haven indicator is 
positive and significant in the asset holding model while insignificant in the financial 
intermediation model, we conclude that tax havens are more used for tax avoidance 
rather than tax evasion. OFC indicator captures factors that affect financial sector like 
regulation, political condition, and geographical features rather than tax haven or 
money laundering as we have already controlled tax haven and money laundering 
effects in our model. So the positive and significant coefficient of OFC indicator 
means that the success of OFCs also depends on their regulation, specialization in 
providing financial service, their good and stable political environment besides the 
preferential tax environment. Intuitively, money laundering centres should get more 
revenue from facilitating money laundering activities; however, we did not find any  
  37 
evidence in this paper. To the contrary, money laundering centres drive the financial 
business away due to their bad reputations. This happens because identification of 
money laundering havens is not based on the amount of money laundered in these 
places but only on their law and regulation systems. Actually, it is a fallacy to single 
RXW DQ\RQHSODFHDV ³WKHPRQH\ODXQGHULQJFDSLWDO RIWKHZRUOG.´ Authorities in 
America even disagree on whether most illegal money is laundered offshore or within 
the United States. Some small islands have different tax regimes that could be 
exploited for the illegal tax evasion purpose, but these differences alone do not make 
such locations more likely to be involved in laundering than so called onshore centers 
(Workman, 1982). However, countries or territories identified as money laundering 
haven suffer from their bad reputation, losing business of both investment and 
financial intermediation.  
5. Welfare analysis of offshore finance 
The welfare impact of offshore finance is controversial. Some argue that offshore 
interface plays a major role in flight of capital, global financial crisis, transfers of 
wealth, increasing poverty and social inequalities. It provides a safe haven for the 
proceeds of political corruption, illicit arms dealing and the global drugs trade, thus 
contributing to the spread of global crime and facilitating the plunder of public funds 
by corrupt elites (Prem Sikka, 2003). The use of elaborate and typically aggressive tax 
avoidance structures also increases the administrative burden of revenue collection. 
Whilst the tax avoidance industry is clearly damaging to the interests of developed 
countries, harmful tax practices are an even greater problem for economies in 
transition and developing countries. In the absence of powerful and sophisticated tax 
authorities like the US Internal Revenue Service, it is relatively easy for trans-national 
corporations, national business and political elites to erode the potential tax base 
(Christensen and Kapoor, 2004). The use of offshore tax havens by global 
corporations is depriving developing countries of some US$50 billion of tax revenues 
each year, large enough to free them from foreign aid, rising debt and poverty. This 
disables local governments to eradicate poverty, fight environmental degradation, and 
make vital investments in social services and economic infrastructure upon which 
human welfare and sustainable economic development depend (Sikka, 2003).  
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On the other hand, some people say the notion that offshore financial centres are 
damaging the legitimate interests of OECD nations through tax competition has no 
sound foundation in economic theory. Competition in tax matters is beneficial and 
world welfare enhancing which weeds out inefficient taxes (Dwyer, 2000). Tamas and 
Takats (2008) show that tax rate cut can broaden the tax base and increase tax 
compliance, thus increasing governments¶ tax revenue. Rose and Spiegel (2007) 
believe that proximity to OFCs is pro-competitive and promotes the efficiency of 
financial sector in the neighbouring countries, which is regarded as the unintended 
positive consequence. Tax havens and offshore finance centres also justify their 
existence by claiming to provide a role as conduits for investment assets entering the 
international capital markets (Christensen and Hampton, 2000).  
As for money laundering, it is good in no way. This is why money laundering 
havens draw so much attention from the global financial institutions. Money 
laundering has devastating social consequences and is a threat to national security 
because it provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, arms dealers, and other 
criminals to operate and expand their criminal enterprises.  
Anyway, there are more voices criticizing the tax and money laundering havens 
than supporting and the pressure on them is increasing. It is natural to ask why these 
havens exist. Small countries, with small domestic financial sectors and limited 
natural resources, may choose to develop offshore business and become an OFC for a 
number of reasons. These include income generating activities and employment in the 
host economy, gaining access to international capital markets, attracting needed 
foreign technical expertise and skills, introducing an element of competition in 
domestic financial system and government revenue through licensing fees, etc. Indeed 
the more successful OFCs, such as the Cayman Islands and the Channel Islands, have 
come to rely on offshore business as a major source of both government revenues and 
economic activity (IMF, 2001).  
 Another question is that given the strong power of the onshore countries and 
dependency of the small economics on them, why they let these havens exist. Joan 
Susan, on the economist radio broadcast (June, 2007), said small offshore financial 
centres exist because big countries allow them to exist. If big countries really want to 
shut down their business, they could. But these countries choose not to do that. Sikka  
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(2003) also believes major nations certainly have powers to shackle tax havens. For 
example, after the September 11
th, 2001 attacks on New York, the US government 
wanted information on the financial links of Osama Bin Laden and his organisation. 
The trail pointed to the Bahamas. When a Bahamas bank refused to open its records, 
the U.S. had it cut off from the world¶s wire transfer systems and the bank changed its 
mind within hours. 
However, although most of the havens were well known in banking circles, 
wealthy nations had not agreed to identify them publicly. One concern is diplomatic 
protocol. Some countries, like Israel and Russia, have long been spared serious 
scrutiny because of their influence. Sometimes governments themselves use offshore 
financial centres, for example, to trade with other countries when it is not politically 
correct to do so or to protect themselves against the possibility of sanctions being 
imposed, as when Iranian assets were frozen in the United States (Dwyer, 2000). 
Another concern is that some smaller island nations and territories are under the 
protection of their former colonial masters like Britain and France (Kahn, 2000). 
Many OFCs are British Crown Dependencies, or former colonies, and are generally 
protected by Western hegemons with major capital markets. As Hampton (1996) said 
the political space, the nature of the relationship between the offshore and its 
mainland onshore, is one of the most important determinants of the success to become 
an OFC. Combined with our analysis about the distance effect in section 3.2, we say 
the political relationship is more important than the geographical location. For 
example, Bermuda, Cayman Island, British Virgin Island and Turk and Caicos Islands, 
which used to be Crown Colonies, have successfully developed as OFCs. They are far 
away from U.K., but they are under the protection of the U.K. government. Although 
in recent years the United Kingdom has clearly come under pressure from its 
European partners to µdo something¶ about its dependent territories (Dwyer, 2000), 
the UK government has sought to pressurise them to reform their system of financial 
regulation and present a respectable face to the world rather than curb their role in 
facilitating flight of capital and global tax avoidance (Sikka, 2003).  
6. Conclusion  
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This paper explores two data sets. One is cross-border asset holding, which is 
stock variable and the other is financial intermediation, which is flow variable. These 
two complementary data sets well reflected the motivation of international capital 
flows. Capital flows into OFCs not mainly for the tax evasion and money laundering 
purpose. OFCs attract investment and generate more revenues due to their lax and 
flexible regulation, good governance, stable political environment and most 
importantly their specialization in providing financial services. We conclude that the 
criticism on offshore financial centres for their notorious role in facilitating tax 
evasion and money laundering is overstated.  
We also find that relaxing financial regulation in industrial countries and global 
efforts in regulating offshore finance have greatly eroded the competitive advantage 
of tax havens. Money laundering havens suffer from their bad reputations and this 
situation become worse as global cooperation against money laundering intensified. 
In contrast, other big and functional OFCs still have their own advantages like 
specialization in providing financial services. Like what Bryan Hunter ± a manager of 
a law firm based in Cayman Islands ± said, successful offshore financial centres 
uphold global transparency and cooperation standards and enable market efficiency 
and competition. It¶s time for offshore financial centres to focus more on improving 
their specialization in financial sectors.  
Although most people think the offshore havens play a bad role in the global 
economic system, wealthy countries have not yet come into agreement to shut them 
down due to some political concerns.  
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Appendix A: data sources 
Distance, language, border, island, landlocked, area, tax haven, money laundering, 
and common law: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose. 
International internet bandwidth: International Telecommunication Union. It is 
defined as total capacity of international Internet bandwidth in Mega Bits Per Second  
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(Mbps). If capacity is asymmetric (i.e., more outgoing than incoming or more 
incoming than outgoing), the outgoing capacity is provided. 
GDP, population, export and import:  
http://ddpext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1
&queryId=135. 
GDP growth rate and financial intermediation:  
http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=SNA&f=group_code%3a201%3bitem_code%3a13 
Gini coefficient: http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ 
Political stability, governance effectiveness, regulation quality, rule of law and 
corruption control: Governance Matters 2008, which is available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
Appendix B: Kuhn-Tucker Conditions 
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Appendix C 
Table 2B Allowing parameter shifting (h: host country; s: source country) 
 Variable model21 model22  
  lgdppc (h) 1.29***  .784***     
  lpop (h) .729***  .728***   
  lgdppc (s) 2.03***  1.19***   
  lpop (s) .801***  .47***   
  larea (h) .188***  .134***   
  larea (s) .0493***  .0924***   
  linba (h) .0621***  .279***   
  linba (s) .0427*  .0952***   
 openness  (h) .00404***  0.00062   
 openness  (s) .00659***  .0042***   
 ofc  (h) .485***  .658***   
 ofct2  (h) -0.203  -0.0137   
 ofct3  (h) 0.199  .634***   
 ofct4  (h) 0.275  .676***   
 ofct5  (h) .632***  .47**   
 ofct6  (h) 1.17***  1.34***   
 oftc  (s) .967***  .731***   
 ofct2  (s) -.35**  .534***   
 ofct3  (s) -.294*  1.18***   
 ofct4  (s) -.301*  .662***   
 ofct5  (s) -0.127  .843***   
 ofct6  (s) -.491*  .966***   
 taxhaven (h) 1.9***  .644***   
 tt2  (h) 0.326  0.233    
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 tt3  (h) -.975**  -1.38***   
 tt4  (h) -1.11***  -1.19***   
 tt5  (h) -1.5***  -.971***   
 tt6  (h) -1.95**  -1.43*   
 taxhaven (s) 1.3***  2.3***   
 tt2  (s) -0.33  -2***   
 tt3  (s) -0.641  -1.92***   
 tt4  (s) -.981**  -3.39***   
 tt5  (s) -.912**  -2.27***   
 tt6  (s) 0  0   
 moneyl (h) -.715***  -.368*   
 mt2  (h) -0.177  -0.212   
 mt3  (h) .618**  0.41   
 mt4  (h) .501*  0.193   
 mt5  (h) .476*  0.132   
 mt6  (h) 0.57  0.651   
 moneyl (s) 0.00713  0.21   
 mt2  (s) 1.03***  0.27   
 mt3  (s) 1.09***  0.317   
 mt4  (s) 1.56***  -.609***   
 mt5  (s) 1.54***  -.739***   
 mt6  (s) 4.21***  4.24***   
  ldist -.89***  -1.01***   
 comlang .724***  .751***   
  border .875***  1.2***   
 comcol 1.28***  .622***   
 island (h) .213***  .287***   
 island (s) .398***  .363***   
  landl (h) .0818**  -0.0085   
  landl (s) .0807**  .134***   
 polstab (h) -.00606***  .0112***   
 polstab (s) 0.00034  -.00962***   
 goveff    (h) 0.00181  -.00601**   
 goveff    (s) -.0569***  -.0279***   
 regqua    (h) .0279***  .0202***   
 regqual (s) .00866**  .0153***   
 rulelaw (h) -0.00555  -0.00471   
 rulelaw (s) .0518***  .038***   
 corrupcontr 
(h)
-.0106*** .00403*   
 corrupcontr 
()
-0.00851 -.0076*   
 commonl (h) -.28*** -.225***   
 commonl (s) -.138*  -.521***   
 t2  0.12  0.0435   
 t3  -.219***  -.438***   
 t4  -.662***  -.722***   
 t5  -.938***  -1.31***   
 t6  -1.05***  -1.37***   
 _cons  -37.2***  -23.5***   
 A djusted 
2 R  0.617  0.629   
 rmse  2.25  2.92   
 N  12691  28444   
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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